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1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider a rm's investment problem in the presence of asymmetric information
and possibility of random shock. We examine both the optimal timing (trigger) and quantity
strategies for the investment.
This paper is based on many previous studies related to the investment decision problem.
The standard framework by McDonald and Siegel (1986) examines the optimal timing of in-
vestment when the investment cost is fully irreversible. Following McDonald and Siegel (1986),
there are many extended models from dierent angles. The rst extension is to incorporate
the reversibility of investment. See Abel and Eberly (1999) and Wong $(2010, 2011)$ . The re-
versibility of investment means that the rm could sell the capital after the investment when the
protability of capital becomes low. Thus, a reversible investment implies that the rm owns
an abandonment option. The main result of Wong (2011) is that higher reversibility accelerates
the investment but not necessarily increases the investment quantity.
The second extension is to incorporate the asymmetric information. As we know, in most
modern rms, rm owners would like to delegate the management to managers, taking advantage
of managers professional skills. In this situation, it is possible to exist asymmetric information
between owners and managers. For example, managers have private information that owners
cannot observe. Grenadier and Wang (2005), Shibata (2009) and Cui and Shibata $(2016a, 2016b)$
provide frameworks on examining the investment strategies under asymmetric information. The
important results are that under asymmetric information, the investment timing is more delayed
and the quantity is more increased than under full information.
The third extension is to incorporate the possibility of random shock. The arrival of random
shock can be regarded as the occurrence of some exogenous event that aects the prot ows
generated by the capital. For example, the technology improvement may increase the revenue
or decrease the operational cost. Alvarez and Stenbacka (2001) present an example in which the
rm faces a cost saving technology improvement at an exponentially distributed arrival time.
Cui and Shibata (2015) consider an investment problem with random shock where the random
shock is associated with a xed level of revenue. One important result of Cui and Shibata (2015)
is that the investment quantity is decreasing with the arrival probability of random shock.
Thus, in this study, we combine the three features: the reversibility of investment, the
asymmetric information and the possibility of random shock. Here, we obtain three important
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results. First, higher reversibility accelerates the investment, but not necessarily increases the
investment quantity. The investment quantity exhibits a $U$-shape with the degree of reversibility.
Second, higher arrival probability of random shock accelerates the investment, but decreases the
investment quantity. The result of investment quantity is contrary to our intuition. From our
intuition, because the arrival of random shock saves the operational cost of per unit quantity,
we conjecture that the rm should increase the quantity. However, we nd that the investment
quantity is decreasing with the arrival probability of random shock. Third, even for a reversible
investment and with the possibility of random shock, the quantity is more increased and the
investment timing is more delayed under asymmetric information than under full information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup
and derives the rm value after investment. Section 3 formulates the investment problem under
asymmetric information. As a benchmark, we also provide the solution to the problem under
full information. Section 4 solves for the optimal strategies under asymmetric information and
discusses the properties. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section, we rst describe the model setup. We then derive the rm value after investment.
2.1 Setup
Consider a rm that is endowed with an option to invest in a project. To commence the project,
the rm simultaneously chooses the quantity and the timing of investment. We assume that
the rm owner delegates the investment decision to a manager. Throughout our analysis, we
assume that both the owner and the manager are risk neutral and aim to maximize their expected
pay-os.
The investment quantity, $q>1$ , aects the random prot ows $\{q(X_{t}-f) : t\geq 0\}$ generated
from the project, where $\{X_{t} : t\geq 0\}$ denotes the random revenue ows and $f>0$ denotes the
operational cost per unit time, both of which are of per unit quantity. The stochastic process,
$\{X_{t}:t\geq 0\}$ is governed by the following geometric Brownian motion:
$dX_{t}=\mu X_{t}dt+\sigma X_{t}dz_{t}, X_{0}=x>0$ , (2.1)
where $\mu>0,$ $\sigma>0$ are constant parameters, and $z_{t}$ is a standard Brownian motion. For
convergence, we assume that $r>\mu$ where $r>0$ is a constant interest rate. In addition, we
assume that the initial value $x$ is too small to make an immediate investment optimal.
The cost to undertake the investment is $I(q;F)$ $:=C(q)+F.$ $C(q)$ denotes the cost of
investment quantity with $C'(q)>0$ and $C"(q)>0$ for all $q>1$ . At the time of investment,
$q>1$ is endogenously chosen to maximize the owner's value. In addition, we assume the xed
set-up cost $F\in\{F_{1}, F_{2}\}$ with $F_{2}>F_{1}>0$ . We denote $\triangle F=F_{2}-F_{1}>0$ . One could interpret
$F_{1}$ as \lower-xed cost"' and $F_{2}$ as \higher-xed cost The probabilities of drawing $F=F_{i}$




Figure 1: Scenario of model
We assume that the project's prot ows $\{q(X_{t}-f) : t\geq 0\}$ are observed by both the owner
and the manager. However, the xed set-up cost $F$ is observed privately only by the manager.
$\dagger$
Immediate after making a contract with the owner, the manager observes whether $F$ is equal to
$F_{1}$ or $F_{2}$ , but the owner cannot observe the true value of $F$ . In this situation, the manager could
divert a value of $\triangle F$ to himself by reporting $F_{2}$ when he truly observes $F_{1}$ . The owner suers
losses from the manager's diversion. Thus, to prevent the losses, the owner must encourage the
manager to tell truth at the time of investment by providing incentives.
After the investment, if the project's prot becomes unfavorable, the rm could abandon
the project. The abandonment decision, once made, is irreversible. We assume that the salvage
at the time of abandonment is $sI(q;F)$ , where $s\in[0$ , 1$]$ denotes the recovery rate of the initial
investment cost. Thus, a higher value of $s$ implies a higher reversibility of investment. If $s=0$
or $s=1$ , the investment is called fully irreversible or fully reversible.
Before the abandonment and after the investment, there exists a possibility of random shock
that inuences the project's prot. Let $\tau^{R}$ denote the arrival timing of the random shock. Here,
we assume that once the random shock occurs, the operational cost of per unit quantity, $f$
decreases to O. That is, the random prot ows after the random shock becomes $\{qX_{t};t\geq\tau^{R}\}.$
For simplicity, we model the arrival of random shock as a Poisson process with intensity $\lambda$ . That
is, over a small time interval $\triangle t$ , the random shock occurs with a probability $\lambda\triangle t.$
We use Figure 1 to explain the scenario of the model. Let $q_{i}=q(F_{i})$ denote the investment
quantity, $\overline{x}_{i}=\overline{x}(F_{i})$ and $\underline{x}_{i}=\underline{x}(F_{i})$ individually denote the investment trigger and abandonment
trigger for $F=F_{i}(i\in\{1,2$ In addition, let $\overline{\tau}_{i}=\inf\{t\geq 0;X_{t}=\overline{x}_{i}\}$ and $\underline{\tau}_{i}=\inf\{t\geq$
$\overline{\tau}_{i};X_{t}=\underline{x}_{i}\}$ individually denote the (random) rst passage time when $X_{t}$ reaches $\overline{x}_{i}$ from below
$\dagger$
In the asymmetric information structure, it is quite common to assume that a portion of investment value is
privately observed by one party (here, the manager) and not observed by the other party (here, the rm owner).
Laont and Martimort (2002) give an excellent overview of situations with asymmetric information.
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and reaches $\underline{x}_{i}$ from above. The model scenario is, when $X_{t}$ , starting o $x$ , increases and arrives
at $\overline{x}_{i}$ , the rm undertakes the investment and decides $q_{i}$ endogenously. Before investment,
there is asymmetric information between the owner and the manager on the value of $F$ . After
investment, if $X_{t}$ , starting o $\overline{x}_{i}$ , decreases and arrives at $\underline{x}_{i}$ , the rm exercises the abandonment.
There exists a possibility of random shock that reduces the operational cost $f$ to O. We could
recognize that a smaller $\overline{x}_{i}$ implies an earlier (later) investment, and a smaller $\underline{x}_{i}$ implies a later
(earlier) abandonment.
2.2 Value after investment
In this subsection, we derive the owner's value after investment, while the abandonment option
is kept alive.
Given $q_{i},$ $\overline{x}_{i}s$ and $\lambda$ , the rm's value at time $\overline{\tau}_{i}$ is formulated as
$V(q_{i}, \overline{x}_{i};s, \lambda)=\sup_{\underline{\tau}_{i}}\mathbb{E}^{\overline{x}_{i}}[e^{-r(t-\overline{\tau}_{i})}q_{l}X_{t}dt-\int_{\tau_{i}}^{\tau^{R}\wedge\underline{\tau}_{i}}e^{-r(t-\overline{\tau}_{i})}q_{i}fdt+e^{-r(\underline{\tau}_{i}-\overline{\tau}_{i})}sI(q_{i};F_{i})],$
(2.2)
where $\mathbb{E}^{\overline{x}_{i}}$ denotes the expectation operator conditional on $\overline{x}_{i}$ . The rst term on the right-hand
side of (2.2) is the present value of the revenue ows $\{qX_{t} : t\in[\overline{\tau}_{i}, \underline{\tau}_{i}]\}$ . The second term is
the present value of the operational cost $f$ , which is stopped either due to the arrival of random
shock at time $\tau^{R}$ , or due to the abandonment at time $\underline{\tau}_{i}$ . The third term is the present value of
salvage $sI(q_{i};F_{i})$ upon the abandonment.
Using the arguments in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), we write (2.2) as
$V(q_{i}, \overline{x}_{i};s, \lambda)=v_{1}q_{i}\overline{x}_{i}-v_{2}q_{i}f+(sI(q_{i};F_{i})+v_{2}q_{i}f-v_{1}q_{i}\underline{x}(q_{i};s, \lambda))(\frac{\overline{x}_{i}}{\underline{x}(q_{i};s,\lambda)})^{\gamma}$ (2.3)
where $v_{1}=1/(r-\mu)$ , $v_{2}=1/(r+\lambda)$ and $\gamma=1/2-\mu/\sigma^{2}-\sqrt{(1/2-\mu/\sigma^{2})^{2}+2r/\sigma^{2}}<0$ . The
third term on the right-hand side of (2.3) captures the value of the abandonment option, dened
by $AO(q_{i}, \overline{x}_{i};s, \lambda)$ . Additionally, $\underline{x}(q_{i};s, \lambda)$ is the optimal abandonment trigger given by
$\underline{x}(q_{i};s, \lambda)=\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}\frac{sI(q_{i};F_{i})+v_{2}q_{i}f}{v_{1}q_{i}}$ , (2.4)
for any xed $q_{i},$ $s$ and $\lambda$ . (2.4) implies an important property. That is, holding $I(q_{i};F_{i})$ xed,
an increase in $\lambda$ (a decrease in $v_{2}$ ) decreases the value of $\underline{x}(q_{i};s, \lambda)$ .
Substituting (2.4) into (2.3), we obtain the value of the abandonment option $AO(q_{i},\overline{x}_{i};s, \lambda)$
as:
$AO(q_{i}, \overline{x}_{i};s, \lambda)=(\frac{v_{1}q_{i}\overline{x}_{i}}{-\gamma})^{\gamma}(\frac{1-\gamma}{sI(q_{i};F_{1})+v_{2}q_{l}'f})^{\gamma-1}>0$ . (2.5)
(2.5) implies that holding $I(q_{i};F_{i})$ xed, an increase in $s$ or a decrease in $\lambda$ (an increase in $v_{2}$ )
increases the value of $AO(q_{i}, \overline{x}_{i};s, \lambda)$ .
3 Investment problem
In this section, we formulate the investment problem under asymmetric information. As a
benchmark, we also provide the solution to the investment problem under full information.
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3.1 Asymmetric information model
In this subsection, we formulate the investment problem when the manager has private infor-
mation on $F.$
As explained earlier, under asymmetric information, the owner must induce the manager
to reveal the private information truthfully by providing incentives. Otherwise, the manager
diverts value for his own interest by misreporting the value of $F$ . In this study, we assume that
the owner signs a contract with the manager at time zero. The contract commits the owner
to give the manager a bonus incentive at the time of investment, to induce the manager to
tell truth. There is no renegotiation after the contract is signed. Here, we describe the bonus
incentive as $w_{i}=w(F_{i})$ . We make no distinguish between the manager's reported $\tilde{F}_{i}$ and true
$F_{i}$ because at the equilibrium, the manager reports the true $F_{i}$ as private information. Thus,
the contract under asymmetric information is described as
$\mathcal{S}^{**}=(q_{i}, \overline{x}_{i},\underline{x}_{i}, w_{i}) , i\in\{1, 2 \},$
where the superscript $**$ refers to the asymmetric information problem.
Then, the investment problem under asymmetric information is to maximize the owner's
option value through the choice of $\mathcal{S}^{**}$ , i.e.,
$q_{1,q_{2,\overline{x}}1,2,2} m_{\frac{a}{x}}x_{w_{1)}w}\sum_{i\in\{1,2\}}p_{i}\{V(q_{i}, \overline{x}_{i};s, \lambda)-I(q_{i};F_{i})-w_{i}\}(\frac{x}{\overline{x}_{i}})^{\beta}$ (3.1)
subject to
$w_{1}( \frac{x}{\overline{x}_{1}})^{\beta}\geq(w_{2}+\triangle F)(\frac{x}{\overline{x}_{2}})^{\beta}$ (3.2)
$w_{2}( \frac{x}{\overline{x}_{2}})^{\beta}\geq(w_{1}-\triangle F)(\frac{x}{\overline{x}_{1}})^{\beta}$ (3.3)
$w_{i}\geq 0, i\in\{1, 2 \}$ , (3.4)
where $\beta=1/2-\mu/\sigma^{2}+\sqrt{(1/2-\mu/\sigma^{2})^{2}+2r/\sigma^{2}}>1.$
Here, the objective function (3.1) is the $ex$ ante owner's option value. The problem includes
four previous models: Grenadier and Wang (2005), Wong (2011), and Cui and Shibata $(2016a,$
$2016b)$ . First, when $s=0,$ $\lambdaarrow+\infty$ and $q_{i}=1$ , the problem is the same as that in Grenadier
and Wang (2005). Second, if $p_{1}=1$ and $\lambda=0$ , the problem becomes that in Wong (2011).
Third, when $s=0$ and $\lambdaarrow+\infty$ , the problem corresponds to Cui and Shibata (2016a). Forth,
when $\lambdaarrow+\infty$ , the problem becomes that in Cui and Shibata (2016b).
We explain the four constraints (3.2) $-(3.4)$ as follows. (3.2) and (3.3) are the $ex$ post
incentive-compatibility constraints for the manager who observes $F_{1}$ and $F_{2}$ , respectively. Taking
(3.2) as an example, the manager's value is $w_{1}(x/\overline{x}_{1})^{\beta}$ if he observes $F_{1}$ and tells the truth,
while the manager's value is $(w_{2}+\triangle F)(x/\overline{x}_{2})^{\beta}$ if he observes $F_{1}$ but reports $F_{2}$ . Then, if (3.2)
is satised, the manager who observes $F_{1}$ has no incentive to tell lie. Similarly, (3.3) is imposed
for the manager who observes $F_{2}$ . (3.4) are the $ex$ post limited-liability constraints. They are
imposed to ensure that the manager could accept the contract.
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3.2 Full information benchmark
In this subsection, we consider the investment problem when the owner observes the true value
of $F.$
Under full information, there is no delegation of the investment because the manager has no
informational advantage. Thus, the contract under full information is described as
$S^{*}=(q_{i}, \overline{x}_{i}, \underline{x}_{i}) , i\in\{1, 2 \},$
where the superscript $(*$ refers to the full (symmetric) information problem.
The owner's maximization problem under full information is dened as
$q_{1_{\rangle}}q_{2,1}, \overline{x}_{2}m_{\frac{a}{x}}x\sum_{i\in\{1,2\}}p_{1}H(x, q_{1}, \overline{x}_{1};F_{1}, s, \lambda)+p_{2}H(x, q_{2}, \overline{x}_{21}F_{2}, s, \lambda)$
, (3.5)
where $x<\overline{x}_{i}$ for any $i(i\in\{1,2\})$ and
$H(x, q_{i}, \overline{x}_{i};F_{i}, s, \lambda)=(V(q_{i}, \overline{x}_{i};s, \lambda)-I(q_{i};F_{i}))(\frac{x}{\overline{x}_{i}})^{\beta}$ (3.6)
Then, we have the following result.
Proposition 1 Suppose the investment problem under full information. For any $i(i\in\{1,2$
$q_{i}^{*}$ and $\overline{x}_{i}^{*}$ are the solutions to the following system of equations:
$C'(q_{i}^{*})= \frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\frac{1}{q_{i}^{*}}[I(q_{i}^{*};F_{i})+\frac{1}{\beta}\frac{1-\eta(q_{i}^{*},\overline{x}_{i}^{*};s,\lambda)}{1-s\eta(q_{i}^{*},\overline{x}_{i}^{*};s,\lambda)}v_{2}q_{i}^{*}f]$ , (3.7)
and
$\overline{x}_{i}^{*}=\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\frac{1}{v_{1}q_{i}^{*}}[I(q_{i}^{*};F_{i})+v_{2}q_{i}^{*}f-\frac{\beta-\gamma}{\beta}AO(q_{i}^{*}, \overline{x}_{i}^{*};s, \lambda)]$ , (3.8)
where $\eta(q_{i}^{*}, \overline{x}_{i}^{*}; s, \lambda)=(1-\gamma)(sI(q_{i}^{*};F_{i})+v_{2}q_{\iota'}^{*}f)^{-1}AO(q_{i}^{*}, \overline{x}_{i}^{*};s, \lambda)$ . In addition, by (2.4), we
have $\underline{x}_{i}^{*}=\underline{x}(q_{i}^{*};s, \lambda)$ .
When $\lambdaarrow+\infty(v_{2}arrow 0)$ , $q_{i}^{*}$ becomes independent of $s$ , the solutions become the same as
in Wong (2010).
4 Model solution
In this section, we provide the solution to the asymmetric information problem. We then discuss
the solution properties.
4.1 Optimal contract
Although the optimization problem under asymmetric information is subject to four inequality
constraints $(3.2)-(3.4)$ , we could simplify the problem through two steps. First, (3.3) is satised
automatically because the manager who observes $F_{2}$ has no incentive to tell lie. The manager
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who observes $F_{2}$ suers a loss of $\Delta F$ if he reports $F_{1}$ . Second, (3.2) is binding. This is because
if holding (3.2) as a strict inequality, we can increase the owner's value by decreasing $w_{1}$ . Thus,
we obtain that at the optimum, $w_{i}(i\in\{1,2\})$ satisfy
$w_{2}=0, w_{1}=( \frac{\overline{x}_{1}}{\overline{x}_{2}})^{\beta}\triangle F$. (4.1)
As a result, the owner's maximization problem under asymmetric information is simplied
as follows:
$\ddagger$
$q_{1)}q_{2,1}, \overline{x}_{2}m_{\frac{a}{x}}x\sum_{i\in\{1,2\}}p_{1}H (x, q_{1}, \overline{x}_{1};F_{1}, s, \lambda)+p_{2}H(x, q_{2},\overline{x}_{2};F_{2}+\phi\triangle F, s, \lambda)$
, (4.2)
where $\phi=p_{1}/p_{2}>0$ and $x<\overline{x}_{i}$ for any $i(i\in\{1,2$ Then we have the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose the investment problem under asymmetric information.
(1). For $i=1$ , the solutions are $q_{1}^{**}=q_{1}^{*},$ $\overline{x}_{1}^{**}=\overline{x}_{1}^{*},$ $\underline{x}_{1}^{**}=\underline{x}_{1}^{*},$ $w_{1}^{**}=(\overline{x}_{1}^{*}/\overline{x}_{2}^{**})^{\beta}\triangle F.$




$\overline{x}_{2}^{**}=\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\frac{1}{v_{1}q_{2}^{**}}[I(q_{2}^{**};F_{2}+\phi\Delta F)+v_{2}q_{2}^{**}f-\frac{\beta-\gamma}{\beta}AO(q_{2}^{**}, \overline{x}_{2}^{**};s, \lambda)]$ , (4.4)
where $\eta(q_{2}^{**}, \overline{x}_{2}^{**};s, \lambda)=(1-\gamma)(sI(q_{2}^{**};F_{2})+v_{2}q_{2}^{**}f)^{-1}AO(q_{2}^{**}, \overline{x}_{2}^{**};s, \lambda)$ . In addition, $\underline{x}_{2}^{**}=$
$\underline{x}(q_{2}^{**};s, \lambda)$ .
In Proposition 2, there are two important remarks. First, we have $q_{2}^{**}\neq q_{2}^{*},$ $\overline{x}_{2}^{**}\neq\overline{x}_{2}^{*}$
and $\underline{x}_{2}^{**}\neq\underline{x}_{2}^{*}$ although $q_{1}^{**}=q_{1}^{*},$ $\overline{x}_{1}^{**}=\overline{x}_{1}^{*}$ and $\underline{x}i^{*}=\underline{x}_{1}^{*}$ . This implies that it is less costly
for the owner to distort $(q_{2}^{**}, \overline{x}_{2}^{**}, \underline{x}_{2}^{**})$ away from $(q_{2}^{*}, \overline{x}_{2}^{*}, \underline{x}_{2}^{*})$ than to distort $(q_{1}^{**},\overline{x}_{1}^{**},\underline{x}_{1}^{**})$ away
from $(q_{1}^{*}, \overline{x}_{1}^{*},\underline{x}_{1}^{*})$ . Second, we have $w_{1}^{**}>0$ and $w_{2}^{**}=$ O. This is because the manager who
observes $F_{1}$ has an informational rent dened by $\Delta F$ that the manager who observes $F_{2}$ doesn't
have. These results are the same as in Grenadier and Wang (2005), Shibata (2009) and Cui and
Shibata $(2016a, 2016b)$ .
4.2 Discussion
To see the solution properties, we consider numerical examples. In order to do to, we assume
that the cost of investment quantity $is^{\S}$
$C(q_{i})=q_{i}^{3}$ . (4.5)
Suppose that the basic parameters are $r=0.05,$ $\mu=0.02,$ $\sigma=0.25,$ $F_{1}=5,$ $F_{2}=10,$ $f=1,$
$s=0.5,$ $\lambda=0.05,$ $p_{1}=0.5$ and $x=1.$
$\ddagger$
For simplication, we use the relation $I(q_{2};F_{2})+\phi\Delta F=I(q_{2};F_{2}+\phi\triangle F)$ .




Figure 2: Optimal quantity and investment trigger
We begin by examining the eects of reversibility, i.e., $s$ , on the optimal investment timing
(trigger) and quantity strategies. We have the following remark.
Remark 1 Higher reversibility accelerates the investment, but not necessarily increases the
investment quantity.
The upper-left panel of Figure 2 illustrates that $\overline{x}_{2}^{**}$ is monotonically decreasing with $s.$
This result is the same as Wong $(2010, 2011)$ and Cui and Shibata (2016b). That is, even
under asymmetric information and with the possibility of random shock, higher reversibility
accelerates the investment. The intuition is that higher reversibility increases the value of the
abandonment option.
The upper-right panel shows that $q_{2}^{**}$ exhibits a $U$-shape against $s$ , with a minimum reached
at around $s=0.5$ . This result is the same as under full information and without the possibility
of random shock, i.e., Wong (2011). That is, an increase in $s$ decreases $q_{2}^{**}$ when $s$ is relatively
low, and increases $q_{2}^{**}$ when $s$ is suciently large.
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We then consider the impact of the arrival probability of random shock, i.e., $\lambda$ . We obtain
the following remark.
Remark 2 Higher arrival probability of random shock accelerates the investment, but decreases
the investment quantity.
The lower-left panel of Figure 2 illustrates that $\overline{x}_{2}^{**}$ is monotonically decreasing with $\lambda$ . The
reason is as follows. On the one hand, as shown in (2.5), an increase in $\lambda$ (a decrease in $v_{2}$ )
decreases the value of the abandonment option. This eect decreases the investment value. On
the other hand, an increase in $\lambda$ reduces the value of operational cost. This eect increases
the investment value. Because the latter eect dominates the former eect, a higher value of $\lambda$
increases the investment value and then accelerates the investment.
The lower-right panel shows that $q_{2}^{**}$ is monotonically decreasing with $\lambda$ . This is an inter-
esting result that contrary to our intuition. From our intuition, we conjecture that an increase
in $\lambda$ should increase $q_{2}^{**}$ because the occurrence of random shock saves the operational cost of
per unit quantity. However, we obtain that higher arrival probability of random shock $(i.e., \lambda)$
induces the rm to undertake a smaller investment quantity $q_{2}^{**}.$
Finally, we compare the investment strategies under full and asymmetric information for any
xed value of $s$ and $\lambda$ . We have the following remark.
Remark 3 Under asymmetric information, the investment timing is more delayed and the
quantity is more increased than under full information.
On the one hand, the upper-left panel of Figure 2 shows $\overline{x}_{2}^{**}>\overline{x}_{2}^{*}$ for any $s$ and the lower-left
panel illustrates $\overline{x}_{2}^{**}>\overline{x}_{2}^{*}$ for any $\lambda$ . These results imply that even for a reversible investment
and with the possibility of random shock, the investment timing is delayed under asymmetric
information than under full information. On the other hand, the upper-right panel shows $q_{2}^{**}>$
$q_{2}^{*}$ for any $s$ and the lower-right panel demonstrates $q_{2}^{**}>q_{2}^{*}$ for any $\lambda$ . These results imply that
the investment quantity is increased under asymmetric information than under full information.
The intuition is that the rm increases the quantity to compensate for the losses due to the
delayed investment. There are tradeos between the eciencies on the investment timing and
quantity strategies.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we examine a rm's optimal timing and quantity strategies for a reversible in-
vestment, under which there exists asymmetric information before investment and possibility of
random shock after investment. We obtain three important results. First, higher reversibility
accelerates the investment, but not necessarily increases the investment quantity. Second, high-
er arrival probability of random shock accelerates the investment, but decreases the investment
quantity. Third, under asymmetric information, the investment timing is more delayed and the
quantity is more increased than under full information.
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The asymmetric information model we have considered in this study assumes that the man-
ager's bonus is a one-time payment incurred at the time of investment. That is, the manager's
bonus has no inuence on the value after investment. However, it should be interesting to con-
sider a continuous bonus incentive that is related to the the prot ows and examine the optimal
investment strategies. We leave this challenge for future work.
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